Monday, August 8, 2016
KingCast, Mortgage Movies, Wally Brown and Chris Nubbe to Sue Pierce County Superior Judge Stanley J. Rumbaugh for Violating GR 16, and First Amendment/Free Press in Fannie Mae v. Brenda Duzan Foreclosure Case.
Official Judicial Complaint Against Free Press Hater Judge Ricardo S. Martinez in 2:17-cv-00031-RSM King J.... by christopher king on Scribd
Rule 59 Motion for Relief from Judgment: Defendant and his lawyers lied and the Federal Court ignored the facts. 4 minutes ago at 2:50 PM
Judge Rumbaugh headed toward 9th District Court and SCOTUS.
The Federal Court had Plaintiffs' Demand for Judicial Notice and Notice of Fraudulent Defense, yet ignored relevant facts shown in that document when issuing its faulty Order of 6 April, 2017.
It is patently obvious that the Court was and is protecting the lies of Defendant Rumbaugh and his Counsel, period.
Read it and weep folks.
You lied and we will continue to expose your lies in each and every Court and social media avenue we can find, for the rest of our natural lives.
CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D.
King et al. v. Stanley Rumbaugh 2:17-CV-0031 Declaration and Rule 59 Motion on Bogus Dismissal of Free Pres... by christopher king on ScribdMark Lindquist - Ethics
Stephen D. Trinnen and Daniel R. Hamilton are two of the lawyers in Prosecutor Mark Lindquist's ethically-challenged office who perpetuate the problem. They are defending Judge Stanley Rumbaugh for refusing to allow camera access in his courtroom in direct and blatant contravention of Washington GR 16, and they are lying their butts off to do so. We are simply not going to tolerate it, and complaints are being lodged with the State Bar, The Judicial Overseers and in Federal Court for Fraud upon the Court. Take a look.
Sorry Sean, I mean to say, "punk ass." Don't worry however, I will explain your role in the case more formally and in a more compelling fashion, see below.
As to the Merits and the forthcoming Rule 59 Motion:
This case is indeed procedurally IDENTICAL to KingCast v. Wright, Findlay & Zak: Stateside lawsuit with one (1) echoing Federal claim is removed by Defendants who hate cameras.
Motion to Dismiss is filed.
Motion to Remand is filed.
Motion to Remand should have been GRANTED, period.
There is nothing that Judge Martinez or Defendants can do to change that fact, and the fact that a Motion to Dismiss was written prior to Remand is of no moment as I noted in prior filings (Docket No. ________ at ______) because the same exact mental energy (and in this case, the same exact deceit and deception) that went into filing the Federal Motion would go into filing the State Motion.
Martinez joins Landya B. McCafferty club in hating the First Amendment and Independent Journalism. See KingCast v. Ayotte, __________, in which McCafferty was forced to Recuse herself after Plaintiff King investigated and determined that she worked for King's opposing Counsel and for same law firm where Defendant Ayotte (then a U.S. Senate candidate) also worked..... without informing King. See McCafferty's nondescript, back-door recusal that fails to cite the reason for said recusal, in direct variance from her typical Recusals of the period at Appendix _______.
The only difference this time, is that if this Court and the Appellate Court disregard the intent of the Law we are a substantially stronger entity with many more contacts than I was 5-6 years ago, and Plaintiff King is joined now by native Washington people who are on the same team ready to approach the legislature to stamp out unlawful conduct by First Amendment haters like Defendant Rumbaugh. We will not let off of this case until Justice is obtained. As members of the Fourth Estate that is our joint and several duty, and it is a duty incumbent of mainstream press as well, however derelict they may be in in this instance.
To wit, the News Tribune has written a number of stories about the power, corruption and lies incumbent in the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office. Plaintiffs have referenced some of these in their filings because there is more corruption and lying and deceit occurring in the case at bar. But the NT will not touch this with a ten foot pole, nor would they ever dare touch on the possibility that Defendant Rumbaugh violated the law in the Bozgoz case, which was the reason Plaintiff King filed a legitimate Notice of Media Coverage PRIOR TO HEARING but was IGNORED by Defendant Rumbaugh.
It becomes then, the exclusive province of truly Independent media to cover these matters, and in so doing as members of the Fourth Estate we must put our Faith in the Judicial, Legislative and Executive branches in order to properly function in what is purportedly a free society. The Judicial Branch has already let us down to this point.
III. Defendant Rumbaugh Does Not Enjoy Absolute Immunity for Administrative Acts.
Judicial Immunity, to the extent it exists, only applies to Judicial Acts and not Administrative Acts.
Clearing a reporter to run video doesn't have jack shit (I suppose I'll change the colloquialism for filing LOL) to do with Judicial Acts folks. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988)
"When applied to the paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has not been particularly controversial. Difficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges. Here, as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches."
As such, Defendant Rumbaugh enjoys only qualified immunity and is subject to Injunctive or Prospective Relief, which is PRECISELY what Plaintiffs argued at (docket No. ______ pp ______).
"Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), for example, this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors for the county's courts. The Court reasoned:
"Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge. . . . That the jurors are selected for a court makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their election or their appointment a judicial act?" Id., at 348.
Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the Court's analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance.
Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719 (1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, we said: "Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking." Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be treated like prosecutors, and thus would 229*229 be amenable to suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis."
In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts — like many others involved in supervising court employees and overseeing the efficient operation of a court — may have been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative.
In short, it is the same way in the case at bar: Defendant Rumbaugh was not adjudicating a goddamn thing. He was simply applying his own bias in an arbitrary and capricious manner to deny what is clearly a Constitutional Right, which brings Plaintiff to his next point:
The fact that Counsel for Judge Rumbaugh lied and fabricated a tale in which Plaintiff Brown had not notified the Court properly and in which Plaintiff King had not placed the Court on Actual Notice of his pending arrival as a First Amendment journalist, or that he had not put the Court on Actual Notice of his ongoing Notice of Media Coverage, when in point of fact he had done so. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Fraud Upon the Court and Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions, Docket Nos. (___ and ____).
Also as far as lying prosecutors go -- and that exactly what this office contains -- you only have qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for fabricating and lying about evidence. See generally Buckley v. Fitzsimmons 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
KingCast, Wally Brown and Chris Nubbe v. Judge Gary Rumbaugh Free Press Lawsuit Motion to Remand by Christopher King on Scribd
Pierce County Superior Judge Stanley J. Rumbaugh for Violating GR 16, and First Amendment/Free Press in Fan...
The Court violated Washington Article 1 §5, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule GR 16 that compels concrete findings by the Court prior to any denial.
RULE GR 16 -- COURTROOM PHOTOGRAPHY AND RECORDING BY THE NEWS MEDIA (a) Video and audio recording and still photography by the news media are allowed in the courtroom during and between sessions, provided
(1) that permission shall have first been expressly granted by the judge; and
(2) that media personnel not, by their appearance or conduct, distract participants in the proceedings or otherwise adversely affect the dignity and fairness of the proceedings.
(b) The judge shall exercise reasonable discretion in prescribing conditions and limitations with which media personnel shall comply.
(c) If the judge finds that sufficient reasons exist to warrant limitations on courtroom photography or recording, the judge shall make particularized findings on the records at the time of announcing the limitations. This may be done either orally or in a written order. In determining what, if any, limitations should be imposed, the judge shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) Open access is presumed; limitations on access must be supported by reasons found by the judge to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh that presumption;
(2) Prior to imposing any limitations on courtroom photography or recording, the judge shall, upon request, hear from any party and from any other person or entity deemed appropriate by the judge; and
(3) Any reasons found sufficient to support limitations on courtroom photography or recording shall relate to the specific circumstances of the case before the court rather than reflecting merely generalized views.